Absorbent Stable Sets
暂无分享,去创建一个
This paper suggests a general framework to deal with learning, dynamics and evolution in games and economic environments. In this general set-up we define a (set-valued) solution concept and prove some properties, including existence. We then discuss more specific dynamical processes and show that the general solution concept provides quite intuitive results for various contexts.
[1] J. Mertens,et al. ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA , 1986 .
[2] Ehud Lehrer,et al. Private-Beliefs Equilibrium , 1991 .
[3] I. Gilboa,et al. A Model of Random Matching , 1992 .
[4] I. Gilboa,et al. Social Stability and Equilibrium , 1991 .
[5] Akihiko Matsui,et al. Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society , 1991 .
[6] D. Fudenberg,et al. Self-confirming equilibrium , 1993 .