Aphasia, language, and theory of mind

Abstract We address the issue of the relation between language and theory of mind (ToM) reasoning involving the understanding of others’ mental states. In particular, we focus on the evidence from people with aphasia and consider methodological issues concerning the nature of ToM tasks and test instructions. Research to date points to the independence of ToM from grammar in that studies of people with aphasia who have profound grammatical impairment retain ToM reasoning. By contrast, difficulties shown by young children and by adults with right hemisphere brain damage on certain ToM tasks often appear to involve the absence of a pragmatic awareness that precludes the expression of ToM reasoning.

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