Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma

Abstract. According to Condorcet, the larger the team of decision-makers using the simple majority rule, the more likely they are to reach correct decisions. This paper examines the validity of this claim under the condition of reduced team competence with size. Determining committee size always involves quality-versus-quantity dilemma. This study provides criteria, as well as an algorithm, for deciding on the optimum size of boards and committees.

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