论文信息 - Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

The equivalence of Bayesian equilibria of two-person games with incomplete information and Nash equilibria of certain n-person polymatrix games is demonstrated by means of a specific “Selten model.” As a byproduct, constructions recently developed for polymatrix games are available for Bayesian equilibria.

Robert W. Rosenthal | Joseph T. Howson

[1] J. Howson. Equilibria of Polymatrix Games , 1972 .

[2] B. Eaves. The Linear Complementarity Problem , 1971 .

[3] G. Dantzig,et al. COMPLEMENTARY PIVOT THEORY OF MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING , 1968 .

[4] C. E. Lemke,et al. Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming , 1965 .

[5] C. E. Lemke,et al. Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games , 1964 .

[6] Robert B. Wilson. Communications to the Editor---Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information , 1969 .

[7] B. Curtis Eaves,et al. Polymatrix Games with Joint Constraints , 1973 .