Founding Family Controlled Firms: Performance, Risk, and Value

An agency theory framework is used to test the effects of founding family control on firm performance, capital structure, and value. Both the finance and management literatures regarding the relationship between firm control and firm value are explored. Controlling for size, industry, and managerial ownership, the results suggest that firms controlled by the founding family have greater value, are operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than other firms.

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