论文信息 - A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion

A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion

Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) represent random variables as convex functions (integrals of the cumulative distribution function). Combining this representation with Blackwell's Theorem (1953), we characterize distributions of posterior means that can be induced by a signal. This characterization provides a novel way to analyze a class of Bayesian persuasion problems.

Emir Kamenica | M. Gentzkow

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