Emerging selective regimes in a fragmented authoritarian environment: The ‘three old redevelopment’ policy in Guangzhou, China from 2009 to 2014

This paper investigates the urban redevelopment process under the ‘three old redevelopment’ policy in Guangzhou, China from 2009 to 2014. It highlights strongly shared interests between stakeholders’ institutions that match the core mechanism of the urban regime approach. The fragmented authoritarianism model is used to explain the origins of such regimes, using concepts such as institutional obstacles and small opportunities. In addition, comparisons are made between three types of places (the ‘three olds’ of towns, factories and village) that experience specific institutional difficulties. Through the ‘three old redevelopment’ policy, selective regimes are emerging in diverse ways to form new informal coalitions and realise potential land values, depending on the place and context in which it is applied. These selectivities can be explained by the analysis of a bias institutional ensemble which privileges some projects and some actors more than others in the ‘three old redevelopment’.

[1]  Jieming Zhu,et al.  Urban Development under Ambiguous Property Rights: A Case of China’s Transition Economy , 2002 .

[2]  Sonia Schoon Chinese strategies of experimental governance. The underlying forces influencing urban restructuring in the Pearl River Delta , 2014 .

[3]  Clarence N. Stone URBAN REGIMES AND THE CAPACITY TO GOVERN: A Political Economy Approach , 1993 .

[4]  Li Ling Hin,et al.  Redevelopment of urban villages in Shenzhen, China – An analysis of power relations and urban coalitions , 2011 .

[5]  Likang Tian The Chengzhongcun Land Market in China: Boon or Bane? — A Perspective on Property Rights , 2008 .

[6]  E. Chan,et al.  Village-led land development under state-led institutional arrangements in urbanising China: The case of Shenzhen , 2017 .

[7]  B. Jessop Institutional Re(turns) and the Strategic – Relational Approach , 2001 .

[8]  Tingwei Zhang Urban Development and a Socialist Pro-Growth Coalition in Shanghai , 2002 .

[9]  Zhenjie Yang ‘Fragmented authoritarianism’ – the facilitator behind the Chinese reform miracle: a case study in central China , 2013 .

[10]  Fulong Wu,et al.  Transformation of the Chinese City, 1995-2005 , 2006 .

[11]  Stan Geertman,et al.  A conceptual framework on modes of governance for the regeneration of Chinese ‘villages in the city’ , 2015 .

[12]  You-Ren Yang,et al.  An Urban Regeneration Regime in China: A Case Study of Urban Redevelopment in Shanghai's Taipingqiao Area , 2007 .

[13]  Fulong Wu,et al.  China's Changing Urban Governance in the Transition Towards a More Market-oriented Economy , 2002 .

[14]  K. Mossberger,et al.  The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory , 2001 .

[15]  Serena Vicari Haddock,et al.  The Political Economy of Urban Regimes , 1997 .

[16]  Andrew C. Mertha “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process* , 2009, The China Quarterly.

[17]  B. Tang,et al.  Institutional barriers to redevelopment of urban villages in China: a transaction cost perspective , 2016 .

[18]  Fulong Wu,et al.  China's Emerging Neoliberal Urbanism: Perspectives from Urban Redevelopment , 2009 .

[19]  J. Davies,et al.  Partnerships versus Regimes: Why Regime Theory Cannot Explain Urban Coalitions in the Uk , 2003 .

[20]  Jieming Zhu,et al.  Local Growth Coalition: The Context and Implications of China's Gradualist Urban Land Reforms , 1999 .

[21]  G. Lin,et al.  The Redevelopment of China's Construction Land: Practising Land Property Rights in Cities through Renewals* , 2015, The China Quarterly.

[22]  S. Ho,et al.  The State, Land System, and Land Development Processes in Contemporary China , 2005 .