CAUDHT: Decentralized Contact Tracing Using a DHT and Blind Signatures

Contact tracing is a promising approach to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Various systems have been proposed to automatise the process. Many designs rely heavily on a centralised server or reveal significant amounts of private data to health authorities. We propose CAUDHT, a decentralized peer-to-peer system for contact tracing. The central health authority can focus on providing and operating tests for the disease while contact tracing is done by the system’s users themselves. We use a distributed hash table to build a decentral messaging system for infected patients and their contacts. With blind signatures, we ensure that messages about infections are authentic and unchanged. A strong privacy focus enables data integrity, confidentiality, and privacy.

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