Nobody cites nobody else: Mathematical models of domestic political conflict

This paper surveys nearly two hundred scholarly works that use mathematical methods, which include stochastic models, difference and differential equation models, expected utility models, and various types of game theoretic models, to study domestic political conflict (DPC), which includes terrorism, guerrilla wars and insurrections. A citation count reveals that the DPC articles surveyed here cite less than three quarters of an article from within their own DPC modelling tradition and cite less than two articles from any DPC modelling tradition. The only exceptions to the rule that “nobody cites nobody else” are the stochastic and expected utility modelers. I conclude that the “field” of formal models of DPC hardly exists: few authors read other authors, few articles cite other articles, few models build on other models. Several suggestions aimed at promoting greater accumulation in formal models of DPC are offered.

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