Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good

In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we raise the following question : how large can a preference domain be to allow for the existence fo strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition? This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include " a minimal rich domain". We discuss that this requirement is weak since the conditions for minimal richness are satisfied by a variety of small domains including the class of quadratic preferences.

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