Power Demand Response Incentive Pricing Model

Power demand response aims to clip the peak and fill the valley of power load by interruptible load management. Its closely related to the safety and economic benefit of the power system. At present, various provinces in China have carried out the pilot work of interruptible load management. The power companies signed contracts with power users to stipulate power users to adjust the power load consumption during peak hours or in emergency situations. The singed contracts should be fair for all power users. At the same time, the specific information about the signed contracts should be protected for privacy preservation, which is a typical federated learning scenario. A fair and privacy-preserving incentive pricing model should be proposed to stimulate power uses to participate in thee interruptible load management. To this end, a power demand response incentive pricing model is proposed. Based on the multi-attribute sealed auction game, the bidding model between the power company and the power users is established. In the single bidding model, the risk of the power user’s demand response is evaluated firstly. The power users could be classified into different group according to their power load characteristics. Then a user classification selection algorithm’ is proposed, which enables both the power company’s revenue and power user risk to be considered, and enables the selected users to achieve balanced peak clipping. A fair mechanism based on integrals is proposed to assure the fairness between all power users. The case simulations demonstrate that effectiveness of the proposed incentive pricing model.

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