Modelling Contingent Protection

Anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) law and policy has become one of the most contentious issues affecting trading relations between members of the World Trade Organisation. A major concern among researchers and policy-makers is that the decision-making process of regulatory authorities responsible for the administration of AD/CVD laws is biased in favour of providing protectionist outcomes for applicants. However, to date there is no agreed approach on how to undertake empirical analyses needed to help AD/CVD policy development. What is needed is an agreed general framework for such analyses. In this paper a new approach, the Competing Claims framework is introduced to model empirically the AD/CVD decision-making process. The Competing Claims approach is more inclusive than approaches used previously and makes it is easier to identify appropriate hypotheses for testing. Using Australian data covering a period characterised by relatively heavy use of AD/CVD processes, the paper compares this new Competing Claims approach to that of previous researchers and concludes that previous approaches, if they had been adopted using the Australian data, would have led to missing variable bias. The implication for future researchers is clear. In order to assess the various potential biases that can inject themselves into the very opaque world of contingent protection decision-making, as broad an empirical model as possible should be used.

[1]  D. Feaver,et al.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION , 2004 .

[2]  D. Feaver,et al.  Unravelling causation: An empirical analysis of contingent protection in Australia , 1999 .

[3]  Thomas J. Prusa,et al.  The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making , 1997 .

[4]  John Weiss,et al.  The World Trade Organisation. , 1997 .

[5]  Corinne Krupp Antidumping Cases in the U.S. Chemical Industry: A Panel Data Approach , 1994 .

[6]  Bruce C. Petersen,et al.  The Effect of Rising Import Competition on Market Power: A Panel Data Study of US Manufacturing , 1994 .

[7]  Jeffrey W. Steagall,et al.  An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases , 1994 .

[8]  J. Waelbroeck,et al.  Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S.: An experiment in comparative political economy , 1994 .

[9]  K. Anderson Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the U. S. International Trade Commission , 1993, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[10]  Michael O. Moore RULES OR POLITICS?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ITC ANTI-DUMPING DECISIONS , 1992 .

[11]  W. Hansen The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism , 1990, American Political Science Review.

[12]  B. Hirsch,et al.  Industry rent seeking and the filing of ‘unfair trade’ complaints , 1989 .

[13]  Douglas Nelson,et al.  The political economy of administered protection , 1982 .