An empirical test of cooperative game solution concepts

This article reports the largest empirical test to date of cooperative game solution concepts with observations taken from naturally occurring markets. In contrast to some previous empirical tests of cooperative game solution concepts with observations taken from classrooms, the empirical results support the theory of the core in general and the “equal propensity to disrupty” solution concept in particular. The Shapley value and the nucleolus receive weaker empirical support.

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