Standards Setting and Antitrust

The following sections are included:TYPES OF STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS DIFFERENTIATEDDIFFERENT TYPES OF STANDARDSFormal Standards Versus De Facto StandardsStandards Versus RegulationsA CASE STUDY: REFORMULATED GASOLINEII. ANTITRUST ISSUES IN STANDARDS SETTINGSTANDARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND MARKETSSTANDARDS SETTING AND DIVERGENT ROLESPATENTED STANDARDS AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCYPOLICY IMPLICATIONSCHOOSING STANDARDSTHE CHOICE OF STANDARDS: DIVERGENT ROLES AND DIVERGENT BELIEFSTHE CHOICE OF STANDARDS: Ex ANTE VERSUS Ex POST ASSESSMENTSTANDARDIZATION, LOCK-IN, AND OPPORTUNISMLIMITATIONS OF THE “HOLD-UP” CONCERN“MANIPULATION” OF STANDARDS: ACTIVE AND PASSIVE CONDUCTSSO IP RULES: MAKING THE CASE FOR CLARITYSSOS AND IP RULES: EFFECT ON PARTICIPATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTSRules Constraining the SSO ItselfRules Affecting ParticipantsParticipation ConstraintsSEARCH AND DISCLOSURE RULES: REPRESENTATION AND BURDENSearchDisclosureLICENSING POLICIESThe “One Patent, One Standard” Problem“Royalty-Free” and “Reasonable Terms““Reasonable Terms“: When Announced?“Reasonable” Terms: How Determined?Antitrust Remedies“Non-Discriminatory” TermsPENDING PATENT APPLICATIONSNon-Disclosure Does Not Equal Lack of KnowledgePublic Policy Regarding Disclosure of Pending Patent ApplicationsTHE NEED FOR CLARITYSANCTIONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCECAPTURING THE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION THROUGH SSO-RULE CLARITYTHE BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION AND THE NEED FOR SPEEDThe Social Costs of DelayConsortia, Organizational Structure, and EfficiencyEFFORTS To BLOCK OR DELAY THE ADOPTION OF A STANDARDRESTRICTIONS ON PARTICIPATIONADOPTION OF IMPLICATED STANDARDSANTITRUST INTERVENTION AND CLARITYPROBLEMS WITH “ONE SIZE FITS ALL” POLICIESCONCLUSIONAPPENDIXON THE PRIVATE AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS INVOLVING PATENTS