On dealing with adversaries fairly

Peer-to-peer systems are often vulnerable to disruption by minorities. There are several strategies for dealing with this problem, but ultimately many of them come down to some kind of voting or collaborative filtering mechanism. Yet there exists a large literature on voting theory, also known as social choice theory. In this note we outline some of its key results and try to apply them to a number of recommender systems in the literature.

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