A Cognitive Agent Model Incorporating Prior and Retrospective Ownership States for Actions

The cognitive agent model presented in this paper generates prior and retrospective ownership states for an action based on principles from recent neurological theories. A prior ownership state is affected by prediction of the effects of a prepared action, and exerts control by strengthening or suppressing actual execution of the action. A retrospective ownership state depends on whether the sensed consequences co-occur with the predicted consequences, and is the basis for acknowledging authorship of actions, for example, in social context. It is shown how poor action effect prediction capabilities can lead to reduced retrospective ownership states, as in persons suffering from schizophrenia.

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