When Security Games Go Green: Designing Defender Strategies to Prevent Poaching and Illegal Fishing

Building on the successful applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) to protect infrastructure, researchers have begun focusing on applying game theory to green security domains such as protection of endangered animals and fish stocks. Previous efforts in these domains optimize defender strategies based on the standard Stackelberg assumption that the adversaries become fully aware of the defender's strategy before taking action. Unfortunately, this assumption is inappropriate since adversaries in green security domains often lack the resources to fully track the defender strategy. This paper (i) introduces Green Security Games (GSGs), a novel game model for green security domains with a generalized Stackelberg assumption; (ii) provides algorithms to plan effective sequential defender strategies -- such planning was absent in previous work; (iii) proposes a novel approach to learn adversary models that further improves defender performance; and (iv) provides detailed experimental analysis of proposed approaches.