Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Thomas Wiseman,et al. A partial folk theorem for games with private learning , 2012 .
[2] Johannes Hörner,et al. Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.
[3] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown , 2010 .
[4] Yuichi Yamamoto. A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.
[5] Antonio Guarnieri,et al. WITH THE COLLABORATION OF , 2009 .
[6] Jérôme Renault,et al. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information , 2009, Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science.
[7] Stephen Morris,et al. Belief Free Incomplete Information Games , 2007 .
[8] Yuichi Yamamoto. Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.
[9] Michihiro Kandori. Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring , 2007 .
[10] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[11] Tristan Tomala,et al. Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: the N-player case , 2007 .
[12] Thomas Wiseman,et al. A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions , 2005 .
[13] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games , 2005 .
[14] S. Athey,et al. Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks , 2008 .
[15] Tristan Tomala,et al. Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[16] Martin W. Cripps,et al. Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information , 2003, Math. Oper. Res..
[17] Nicolas Vieille,et al. Strategic learning in games with symmetric information , 2003, Games Econ. Behav..
[18] Michele Piccione,et al. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[19] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.
[20] S. Athey,et al. Optimal Collusion with Private Information , 1999 .
[21] Michihiro Kandori,et al. Private Observation, Communication and Collusion , 1998 .
[22] Olivier Compte. Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring , 1998 .
[23] Glenn Ellison. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching , 1994 .
[24] D. Fudenberg,et al. Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players , 1994 .
[25] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Efficiency and Observability in Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players , 1994 .
[26] D. Fudenberg,et al. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with Funding from Working Paper Department of Economics the Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information , 2022 .
[27] Michihiro Kandori,et al. Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players , 1992 .
[28] Michihiro Kandori. Social Norms and Community Enforcement , 1992 .
[29] Drew Fudenberg,et al. Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players , 1990 .
[30] E. Stacchetti,et al. Towards a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring , 1990 .
[31] E. Stacchetti,et al. Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring , 1986 .
[32] R. Radner,et al. An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria , 1986 .
[33] R. Radner. Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting , 1985 .
[34] Sergiu Hart,et al. Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information , 1985, Math. Oper. Res..
[35] Françoise Forges. Note on nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information , 1984 .
[36] S. Sorin. “Big Match” with lack of information on one side (part i) , 1984 .
[37] Â Sylvain Sorin,et al. "Big match" with lack of information on one side (Part II) , 1984 .
[38] R. Porter,et al. NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION UNDER IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION , 1984 .
[39] Elon Kohlberg,et al. Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information , 1975 .