Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain

Recent research suggests that patterns of interaction among organized American interests have important implications for pluralist theory. The research presented here confirms that competition for policy attention exists among multiple interests having divided policy goals. However, the findings challenge the view that a proliferation of organizations leads to actual competition between interest groups as issues are resolved. It does so by shifting the level of analysis from the domain level to the issue level in order to provide a common substantive context for elite/pluralist interpretations. The analysis argues, using transaction theory, that organized interests cultivate specific and recognizable identities. From these identities, they come to occupy issue niches where they only infrequently ally themselves with or become adversaries of other interests. Rather than do so, most interests accommodate one another by concentrating on very narrow issues. Only a few organizations, usually the least influential, focus on encompassing or sectorwide issues or become large scale coalition players. That is, most interest groups avoid conflict situations. The data base includes interviews with 238 interest representatives, tracing their involvement on 402 prioritized issues and 180 acts and regulations that were finally passed.

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