Management Entrenchment the Case of Manager-specific Investments*

We describe how managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments that make it costly for shareholders to replace them. By making manager-specific investments. managers can reduce the probability of being replaced extract higher wages and larger perquisites from shareholders. and obtain more latitude in determining corporate strategy. Our model of entrenchment has empirical implications that are consistent with the evidence on managerial behavior.

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