Using Mechanism Design to Prevent False-Name Manipulations

The basic notion of false-name-proofness allows for useful mechanisms under certain circumstances, but in general there are impossibility results that show that false-name-proof mechanisms have severe limitations. One may react to these impossibility results by saying that, since false-name-proof mechanisms are unsatisfactory, we should not run any important mechanisms in highly anonymous settings—unless, perhaps, we can find some methodology that directly prevents false-name manipulation even in such settings, so that we are back in a more typical mechanism design context. However, it seems unlikely that the phenomenon of false-name manipulation will disappear anytime soon. Because the Internet is so attractive as a platform for running certain types of mechanisms, it seems unlikely that the organizations running these mechanisms will take them offline. Moreover, because a goal of these organizations is often to get as many users to participate as possible, they will be reluctant to use high-overhead solutions that discourage users from participating. As a result, perhaps the most promising approaches at this point are those that combine techniques from mechanism design with other techniques discussed in this article. It appears that this is a rich domain for new, creative approaches that can have significant practical impact.

[1]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..

[2]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocol Utilizing Greedy Allocation Based on Approximate Evaluation Values , 2002, PRIMA.

[3]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods , 1977 .

[4]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions , 2005, Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks.

[5]  D. Black On the Rationale of Group Decision-making , 1948, Journal of Political Economy.

[6]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction , 2004, Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004..

[7]  E. Maskin,et al.  The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .

[8]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents , 2010, CACM.

[9]  Michael Kaminsky,et al.  SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks , 2006, SIGCOMM.

[10]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules , 2008, WINE.

[11]  H. Moulin On strategy-proofness and single peakedness , 1980 .

[12]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-Name Bids , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[13]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness , 2007, TARK '07.

[14]  Kevin Leyton-Brown,et al.  Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions , 2007, SECO.

[15]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values , 2003, AAMAS '03.

[16]  S. Bikhchandani,et al.  Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation , 2006 .

[17]  John Langford,et al.  CAPTCHA: Using Hard AI Problems for Security , 2003, EUROCRYPT.

[18]  Rudolf Müller,et al.  Tractable cases of the winner determination problem , 2006 .

[19]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Anonymity-proof Shapley value: extending shapley value for coalitional games in open environments , 2008, AAMAS.

[20]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal , 2010, AAMAS.

[21]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids , 2001, Proceedings 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems.

[22]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions , 2009, AAMAS.

[23]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments , 2005, IJCAI.

[24]  L. S. Shapley,et al.  17. A Value for n-Person Games , 1953 .

[25]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids , 2001, IJCAI.

[26]  A. Gibbard Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[27]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account , 2008, AMEC/TADA.

[28]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms , 2010, AAMAS.

[29]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[30]  A. Gibbard Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance , 1977 .

[31]  Hiroshi Nagamochi,et al.  Minimum cost source location problem with vertex-connectivity requirements in digraphs , 2001, Inf. Process. Lett..

[32]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks , 2010, WINE.

[33]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments , 2006, AAAI.

[34]  John R. Douceur,et al.  The Sybil Attack , 2002, IPTPS.

[35]  Michael Kaminsky,et al.  SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense against Sybil Attacks , 2008, S&P 2008.

[36]  R. Myerson Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem , 1979 .

[37]  Feng Xiao,et al.  SybilLimit: A Near-Optimal Social Network Defense Against Sybil Attacks , 2010, IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw..

[38]  International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems ( IFAAMAS ) , 2007 .

[39]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting , 2008, AAAI.

[40]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  An average-case budget-non-negative double auction protocol , 2002, AAMAS '02.

[41]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[42]  Edith Elkind,et al.  Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games , 2008, AAMAS.

[43]  Makoto Yokoo,et al.  A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bids , 2005, Decis. Support Syst..

[44]  Philip Wolfe,et al.  Contributions to the theory of games , 1953 .

[45]  John Langford,et al.  Telling humans and computers apart automatically , 2004, CACM.