On the Value of Correlation

Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payoffs) is greater than their surplus in all mixed-strategy equilibria. Following the idea initiated by the price of anarchy literature (Koutsoupias & Papadimitriou, 1999; Papadimitriou, 2001) this suggests the study of two major measures for the value of correlation in a game with non-negative payoffs: 1. The ratio between the maximal surplus obtained in a correlated equilibrium to the maximal surplus obtained in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. We refer to this ratio as the mediation value. 2. The ratio between the maximal surplus to the maximal surplus obtained in a correlated equilibrium. We refer to this ratio as the enforcement value. In this work we initiate the study of the mediation and enforcement values, providing several general results on the value of correlation as captured by these concepts. We also present a set of results for the more specialized case of congestion games (Rosenthal, 1973), a class of games that received a lot of attention in the recent literature.

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