论文信息 - Differential Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems

Differential Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems

In this paper we extend the ideas for differential fault attacks on the RSA cryptosystem (see) to schemes using elliptic curves. We present three different types of attacks that can be used to derive information about the secret key if bit errors can be inserted into the elliptic curve computations in a tamper-proof device. The effectiveness of the attacks was proven in a software simulation of the described ideas.

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