Dynamics of rules internalized in dynamic cognitive agents playing a multi-game

Rules such as laws, institutions, and norms can be changed dynamically in our society, because they are shaped by interactions among social members who are affected by them. However, there are also some stable rules enhanced by interactions among rules. In this article, we discuss whether or not rules can be stabilized by interactions among the rules. To investigate this, we propose a multi-game model in which different games are played simultaneously by the dynamic cognitive agents. A minority game (MG) and an n-person iterated prisoners’ dilemma game (NIPDG) are adopted. In our simulation, we found that the agents internalize the complex rules expressed as intricate geometrical shapes like strange attractors on the phase spaces, when the complex macro dynamics emerged. Furthermore, it showed that the macro dynamics shaped by the macro rules in the MG can be stabilized by interaction between the MG and the NIPDG rules internalized in the agents.