of ‘behavior’ seems insufficient to capture such changes in ‘robust inclination.’ For example, hypersexuality as a result of DBS can become manifest in behavior, but may also remain an inclination that a patient can experience (and perhaps struggle with) without there being any manifest behavioral changes. The notion of ‘robust inclinations’ appears to point to things like inclinations, predispositions and preferences, which might not be captured in standard neuropsychological testing. Another relevant consideration regards the social and relational aspects of identity. Changes in narrative identity may be problematic even if the person in question embraces them or does not notice them himself, if they have a profound impact on the lives of others or on significant relationships. In patients treated with DBS, for example, the changes in mood or attitude can take friends and family by surprise and deeply affect them (Gisquet 2008). Researchers within neuroethics need to develop clearer conceptions of important notions such as self, personality, personhood, personal identity and the like, and their relationships to specific mental functions. Notions that are so central to the discussion should be used with the greatest possible precision. Even if scholars in the field of neuroethics would fail to agree upon a single theory, or a common unequivocal vocabulary—as will likely be the case, at least for the near future—they must make it clear from what theoretical and conceptual framework they depart and how this influences their research questions and results. Such conceptual clarifications also have important practical implications. Standardized neuropsychological tests may prove insufficient to render the kind of data that one would be most interested in. New instruments and scales may have to be developed, keeping in mind the specifics of the new neurotechnique in question. In any case, there are many tests and scales available and researchers will have to choose which ones will provide the most relevant data. Next to structured interviews with family and friends, interviews with the patient himself are indispensable. Here again, conceptual clarity is a prerequisite for asking the right kind of questions. In order to advance neuroethical research into side effects of new neurotechnologies, we need both empirical and conceptual work.
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