论文信息 - Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.

Andrew Postlewaite | Richard P. McLean | Andrew Postlewaite | R. McLean

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