On a risk perspective for maritime domain

In the maritime domain, the risk is evaluated withi n the framework of Formal Safety Assessment (FS A), introduced by International Maritime Organization i n 2002. Although the FSA has become internationally recognized and recommended method, the definition, which is adopted there, to describe the risk, seems to be too narrow to reflect properly the actual content o f he FSA. Therefore this article discusses methodo logical requirements for the risk perspective, which is app ro riate for risk management in the maritime domain w th the special attention to maritime transportation sy stems (MTS). This perspective considers risk as a s et encompassing the following: the set of plausible sc narios leading to an accident, the likelihoods of the unwanted events within the scenarios and the conseq uences of the events. These elements are conditiona l upon the available knowledge about the analyzed system, and understanding of the system behaviour, therefor e these two are inherent parts of risk analysis, and need t o be included in the risk description. Montewka Jakub, Goerlandt Floris, Kujala Pentti On a risk perspective for maritime domain 102 To make sure that all these relevant recommendations, which are located in different chapters of the guidelines, can be properly address ed at the appropriate stages of the risk analysis, a r isk perspective, which foresees them needs to be adopted. This means, that such a perspective allows for the knowledgeand experience-based scenario building, thorough analysis of risk model uncertain ty and model validation, see for example [29]–[30]. Otherwise, FSA being considered proactive, highly technical and complex method may be misused or even manipulated, yielding the results which may no t fully reflect the relevant features of the analyzed system, for a discussion see for example [10], [16] . Therefore this paper serves the purpose of adding t o the discussion asked for by Psaraftis and Aven, proposing the requirements for a risk perspective suitable for the maritime domain. The presented perspective enables risk-informed and knowledgebased decision making by reflecting the available knowledge and understanding of the analyzed system and mapping those into a model. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows . The methodological requirements allowing risk description for a MTS are given in Chapter 2 and explained further in Chapter 3 along with some examples fro the field of maritime transportation. Concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 4.

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