论文信息 - Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies

Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies

We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles or selling “at-fault” insurance can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare.

Howard Kunreuther | Alexander Muermann | H. Kunreuther | Alexander Muermann

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