Effective Usage of Computational Trust Models in Rational Environments

Reputation-based trust models using statistical learning have been intensively studied for distributed systems where peers behave maliciously. However practical applications of such models in environments with both malicious and rational behaviors are still very little understood. This paper studies the relation between accuracy of a computational trust model and its ability to effectively enforce cooperation among rational agents. We provide theoretical results showing under which conditions cooperation emerges when using a trust learning algorithms with given accuracy and how cooperation can be still sustained while reducing cost and accuracy of those algorithms. We then verify and extend these theoretical results to a variety of settings involving honest, malicious and strategic players through extensive simulation. These results will enable a much more targeted, cost-effective and realistic design for decentralized trust management systems, such as needed for peer-to-peer systems and electronic commerce.

[1]  Lars Brückner,et al.  On the Simulation of Global Reputation Systems , 2005, J. Artif. Soc. Soc. Simul..

[2]  Paul Resnick,et al.  Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[3]  Zhu Han,et al.  A trust evaluation framework in distributed networks: Vulnerability analysis and defense against attacks , 2006, Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2006. 25TH IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications.

[4]  Karl Aberer,et al.  Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system , 2001, CIKM '01.

[5]  Bernhard von Stengel,et al.  Chapter 51 Inspection games , 2002 .

[6]  Mudhakar Srivatsa,et al.  TrustGuard: countering vulnerabilities in reputation management for decentralized overlay networks , 2005, WWW '05.

[7]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  A Probabilistic Trust Model for Handling Inaccurate Reputation Sources , 2005, iTrust.

[8]  Michael J. North,et al.  Experiences creating three implementations of the repast agent modeling toolkit , 2006, TOMC.

[9]  Karl Aberer,et al.  P2P reputation management: Probabilistic estimation vs. social networks , 2006, Comput. Networks.

[10]  Ernesto Damiani,et al.  Choosing reputable servents in a P2P network , 2002, WWW.

[11]  Weisong Shi,et al.  Analysis of ratings on trust inference in open environments , 2008, Perform. Evaluation.

[12]  Paul Graham,et al.  Hackers & Painters: Big Ideas from the Computer Age , 2010 .

[13]  Jennifer Golbeck,et al.  Trust on the World Wide Web: A Survey , 2006, Found. Trends Web Sci..

[14]  Raouf Boutaba,et al.  Management in peer-to-peer systems: Trust, reputation and security , 2006, Comput. Networks.

[15]  Ling Liu,et al.  PeerTrust: supporting reputation-based trust for peer-to-peer electronic communities , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering.

[16]  Chrysanthos Dellarocas.  Efficiency and Robustness of Binary Feedback Mechanisms in Trading Environments with Moral Hazard , 2003 .

[17]  Raph Levien,et al.  Attack-Resistant Trust Metrics , 2009, Computing with Social Trust.

[18]  David Abramson,et al.  Economic models for management of resources in peer-to-peer and grid computing , 2001, SPIE ITCom.

[19]  Sarvapali D. Ramchurn,et al.  Trust evaluation through relationship analysis , 2005, AAMAS '05.

[20]  George C. Necula,et al.  Proof-carrying code , 1997, POPL '97.

[21]  Hector Garcia-Molina,et al.  The Eigentrust algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks , 2003, WWW '03.

[22]  Mike P. Papazoglou,et al.  Service-Oriented Computing , 2008 .

[23]  Emmanuelle Anceaume,et al.  Incentive-Based Robust Reputation Mechanism for P2P Services , 2006, OPODIS.

[24]  A. Jøsang,et al.  Filtering Out Unfair Ratings in Bayesian Reputation Systems , 2004 .

[25]  Rudolf Avenhaus,et al.  Inspection Games , 2009, Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science.

[26]  Chrysanthos Dellarocas,et al.  Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard , 2005, Inf. Syst. Res..

[27]  Karl Aberer,et al.  A Probabilistic Framework for Decentralized Management of Trust and Quality , 2007, CIA.

[28]  Krishna P. Gummadi,et al.  King: estimating latency between arbitrary internet end hosts , 2002, IMW '02.

[29]  Boi Faltings,et al.  Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback , 2006, EC '06.

[30]  Daniel Stutzbach,et al.  Understanding churn in peer-to-peer networks , 2006, IMC '06.

[31]  E. Friedman,et al.  The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms , 2001 .

[32]  Paul Resnick,et al.  Reputation systems , 2000, CACM.

[33]  Karl Aberer,et al.  Using identity premium for cooperation enforcement and whitewashing prevention in rational environments , 2010 .

[34]  Audun Jøsang,et al.  A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision , 2007, Decis. Support Syst..

[35]  Karl Aberer,et al.  P-Grid: a self-organizing structured P2P system , 2003, SGMD.

[36]  R. H. Smith,et al.  Reputation Mechanisms , 2005 .

[37]  Paul Graham.  Hackers and painters - big ideas from the computer age , 2004 .

[38]  Zoran Despotovic.  Building trust-aware P2P systems , 2005 .

[39]  Evimaria Terzi,et al.  On Honesty in Sovereign Information Sharing , 2006, EDBT.

[40]  Karl Aberer,et al.  A Probabilistic Approach to Predict Peers? Performance in P2P Networks , 2004, CIA.

[41]  Karl Aberer,et al.  Beyond "Web of trust": enabling P2P e-commerce , 2003, EEE International Conference on E-Commerce, 2003. CEC 2003..