Authentication Codes

The Pret a Voter end-to-end verifiable voting system makes use of receipts, retained by voters, to provide individual verifiability that their vote has been recorded as cast. The paper discusses issues around the production and acceptance of receipts, and presents an alternative approach to individual verifiability based on Authentication Codes. These codes are constructed, in the encrypted domain, by the peered Web Bulletin Board when the vote is cast, and provide the voter with an assurance that their vote has been properly received. The approach is designed to work in a uniform way with ranked elections and single preference elections.

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