BitStore : An Incentive-Compatible Solution for Blocked Downloads in BitTorrent

As many as 30% of all files shared on public BitTorrent networks suffer from the lack of “seeders” (peers that have complete copies of the file being shared); peers attempting to download such a file (“leechers”) may have to wait indefinitely to obtain certain file chunks that are not distributed in the file’s network of peers (the “swarm”). We call this the Blocked Leecher Problem (BLP). To alleviate BLP, we propose BitStore, a larger, secure network of BitTorrent users (not necessarily all sharing the same content) where nodes offer their resources (such as disk space and bandwidth) for public use. Peers sharing any file can use the storage network to maintain replicas for each chunk of the file. Any leecher seeking chunks that are absent from in its own swarm can query the public network, locate the node storing the said chunks, and retrieve them. BitStore also provides robust incentives for nodes contributing resources: In return for storing and serving chunks, such nodes can negotiate micropayments using a second-price auction. Peers who receive these credits may later use them to retrieve blocks they need from the storage network. This paper quantifies the BLP, presents an overview of the BitStore design, and discusses various challenges related to storage management and incentives.

[1]  R. Gibbons Game theory for applied economists , 1992 .

[2]  Bruce Schneier,et al.  Applied cryptography : protocols, algorithms, and source codein C , 1996 .

[3]  N. Asokan,et al.  Optimistic protocols for fair exchange , 1997, CCS '97.

[4]  Michael K. Reiter,et al.  Byzantine quorum systems , 1997, STOC '97.

[5]  I. Clarke,et al.  A distributed anonymous information storage and retrievalsystem , 2000 .

[6]  Ian Clarke,et al.  Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage and Retrieval System , 2000, Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability.

[7]  David Mazières,et al.  Tangler: a censorship-resistant publishing system based on document entanglements , 2001, CCS '01.

[8]  David R. Karger,et al.  Wide-area cooperative storage with CFS , 2001, SOSP.

[9]  David R. Karger,et al.  Chord: A scalable peer-to-peer lookup service for internet applications , 2001, SIGCOMM '01.

[10]  B. E. Eckbo,et al.  Appendix , 1826, Epilepsy Research.

[11]  Miguel Castro,et al.  Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive recovery , 2002, TOCS.

[12]  Silvio Micali,et al.  Micropayments Revisited , 2002, CT-RSA.

[13]  Miguel Castro,et al.  SplitStream: High-Bandwidth Content Distribution in Cooperative Environments , 2003, IPTPS.

[14]  Rodrigo Rodrigues,et al.  Proceedings of Hotos Ix: the 9th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems Hotos Ix: the 9th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems High Availability, Scalable Storage, Dynamic Peer Networks: Pick Two , 2022 .

[15]  B. Cohen,et al.  Incentives Build Robustness in Bit-Torrent , 2003 .

[16]  Ion Stoica,et al.  Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks , 2003 .

[17]  Ion Stoica,et al.  Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks , 2004, EC '04.

[18]  Mikel Izal,et al.  Dissecting BitTorrent: Five Months in a Torrent's Lifetime , 2004, PAM.

[19]  John C.-I. Chuang,et al.  Incentive mechanism for peer-to-peer media streaming , 2004, Twelfth IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service, 2004. IWQOS 2004..

[20]  Johan A. Pouwelse,et al.  The Bittorrent P2P File-Sharing System: Measurements and Analysis , 2005, IPTPS.

[21]  Michael Dahlin,et al.  BAR fault tolerance for cooperative services , 2005, SOSP '05.

[22]  Michael Sirivianos,et al.  Dandelion: Cooperative Content Distribution with Robust Incentives , 2007, USENIX Annual Technical Conference.

[23]  Arun Venkataramani,et al.  Do incentives build robustness in bit torrent , 2007 .