Interest Representation and Democratic Gridlock

What accounts for variation in the ability of governments to introduce and enact legislation? We examine how interest organization populations, and especially their properties of density and diversity, influence introductions, enactments, and the ratio of bill enactments to introductions. After reviewing a number of hypotheses about interest organizations and legislative activity, we test their competing expectations with data on state legislative activity during 1990 and 1991. Along the way, we test the divided government hypothesis as well. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for further study of the influence of interest organization populations.

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