A Comment on “ How Portable is Level-0 Behavior ? A Test of Level-k Theory in Games with Non-neutral Frames ” by Heap , Rojo-Arjona , and Sugden

Rubinstein and Tversky (1993), Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996), and Rubinstein (1999) reported experiments that elicited initial responses to coordination, discoordination, and hide and seek games with non-neutral decision labelings, in which behavior responded to labeling. Crawford and Iriberri (2007ab) proposed a level-k model to account for the results for hide and seek games. Heap, Rojo-Arjona, and Sugden (2014) report an experimental test of Crawford and Iriberri’s model, concluding that it lacks portability. This comment seeks to clarify Heap et al.’s interpretation of their results and their account of Crawford and Iriberri’s analysis, and to better identify the way forward.

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