Perceptions of Firmness and Strength in Negotiation
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Subjects first observed a pair of negotiations between two confederates of the same sex, and then negotiated with one of these confederates. Those who had observed their opponent follow a matching strategy conceded more than those who had observed their opponent follow either a tough or soft strategy. Confederates using a matching strategy were rated as stronger than those using a soft strategy and fairer than those using a tough strategy. These results support an attributional explanation for a previous finding that use of a matching strategy tends to encourage concessions from an adversary. Other results suggest that observers of negotiation view the parties they are observing as contrasting in strength and fairness.
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