Philosophical Argumentation: Logic and Rhetoric

The subject of the present paper is a specific type of argumentation, namely philosophical argumentation. Nevertheless, I believe that its aims and conclusions are pertinent to argumentation in general. Since we are dealing with philosophy, let me begin my discussion with a very general question: when and why does one use the term ‘argumentation’? One reasonable answer to this question is that the term argumentation distinguishes the discourse it refers to from formal demonstration on the one hand and irrational dispute on the other. In other words, the term ‘argumentation’ refers to a middle ground between impersonal methods and irrational approaches. This was Chaim Perelman’s challenge and project. Perelman presents his study of argumentation as a response to the strict dichotomy between rationality and irrationality asserted by the positivists: either one provides empirical or logical proof, or one fails to provide a rational justification. Perelman’s main concern was with practical reasoning related to values, but there is more than a suggestion in his work that he also contemplated philosophy in general and even metaphysics. His basic claim is that there is a portion of rational thinking and argumentation that cannot be reduced to logic or empirical methods. Perelman defined this argumentation by turning to Aristotle’s works on rhetoric and dialectic. He entitled his synthesis between rhetoric and dialectic ‘the new rhetoric’. ‘The new rhetoric’ not only draws attention to the fact that there are rational arguments that are neither logical nor empirical, but also paves the way to his claim that we incorrectly perceive philosophical arguments as logical ones. Perelman never completed his project concerning philosophical argumentation and the present paper can be perceived as another step in that direction. The logical orientation of philosophy derives from the philosopher’s desire to find ways to distinguish between accidental and subjective thoughts and necessary and objective ones. Logic is perceived as a means of achieving this since it offers clearly defined rules of thinking that are not contingent upon the accidental judgment of any individual (philosopher). The term ‘logic’ hence became, in philosophical discourse, a general name for any attempt to present a consistent and accurate thought. My claim is that free use of the term ‘logic’, together with disregard for the