论文信息 - The Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions

The Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions

In this paper, we provide two extensions of the constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of bankruptcy situations with a priori unions. We present some characterisations and relations with corresponding games. The two new extensions are illustrated by a specific application.

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