THE DISTRIBUTION OF EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES

Suppose the n X n matrix A gives the payoffs for some evolutionary game, and its entries are the values of independent, identically distributed, continuous random variables. The distribution of the pattern of evolutionarily stable strategies for A will depend, if n - 3, on this underlying distribution. A fairly complete picture for n = 3 is found, and some results are obtained for n _ 4.

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