论文信息 - On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

On the inconsistency of certain axioms on solution concepts for non-cooperative games

Abstract The mutual compatibility of four recently discussed axioms on solution concepts for extensive form games is explored. Two subsets of the axioms are shown to be inconsistent. Our results underline the importance of the information lost in moving from the extensive form to the normal (or agent-normal) form of a game.

Dilip Abreu | David G Pearce

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