Ambiguity and competitive decision making: Some implications and tests

Contrary to most formal models of decision making under risk and uncertainty that are built on the basis ofprescriptive behavioral principles or axioms, this paper derives adescriptive model of decision making under ambiguity based on principles of behavior, i.e. principles that describehow people behave as opposed to how theyshould behave. The model assumes that people evaluate the impact of ambiguous probabilities by first anchoring on a given value of the unknown probability and then adjusting this by the net effect of imagining or “trying out” other values the probability could take. The mental simulation process incorporates giving differential weight to the ranges of probability values above and below the anchor where such weight reflects individual and situational variables. In particular, the assumption that people are cautious as opposed to reckless in making decisions leads to attributing more weight to possible values of probabilities below the anchor when considering potential gains, and the reverse when faced with potential losses. Two experiments test implications of the model for situations involving competitive decisions. The first concerns legal decision making, the second involves the purchase and sale of industrial equipment. Both experiments validate predictions that (a) the effects of ambiguity depend on both the sign of payoffs and the level of probabilities, and (b) two parties to a negotiation or transaction may be differentially sensitive to ambiguity. Finally, the model is compared to other models of ambiguity proposed in the literature, and directions are suggested for future work.

[1]  M. Bazerman Negotiator Judgment , 1983 .

[2]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[3]  Uzi Segal,et al.  The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach , 1987 .

[4]  L. J. Savage,et al.  Personal probabilities of probabilities , 1975 .

[5]  K. MacCrimmon,et al.  Utility Theory: Axioms Versus ‘Paradoxes’ , 1979 .

[6]  J. Quiggin A theory of anticipated utility , 1982 .

[7]  A. Tversky Intransitivity of preferences. , 1969 .

[8]  Robin M. Hogarth,et al.  Decision Making Under Ambiguity: A Note , 1988 .

[9]  H. J. Einhorn,et al.  Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena. , 1987 .

[10]  M. Yaari The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk , 1987 .

[11]  W. Fellner Distortion of Subjective Probabilities as a Reaction to Uncertainty , 1961 .

[12]  N. Cantor,et al.  Defensive pessimism: harnessing anxiety as motivation. , 1986, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[13]  Howard Kunreuther,et al.  Risk, ambiguity, and insurance , 1989 .

[14]  D. Ellsberg Decision, probability, and utility: Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms , 1961 .

[15]  Lola L. Lopes Some thoughts on the psychological concept of risk. , 1983 .

[16]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Recent developments in modelling preferences under risk , 1987 .

[17]  J. P. Gould,et al.  The Economics of Legal Conflicts , 1973, The Journal of Legal Studies.

[18]  Rakesh K. Sarin,et al.  Modeling Ambiguity in Decisions Under Uncertainty , 1988 .

[19]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect theory: analysis of decision under risk , 1979 .

[20]  E. Rowland Theory of Games and Economic Behavior , 1946, Nature.

[21]  Colin Camerer,et al.  Experimental markets for insurance , 1989 .

[22]  Louis Narens,et al.  Classification of concatenation measurement structures according to scale type , 1985 .

[23]  R. Thaler Toward a positive theory of consumer choice , 1980 .

[24]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Ellsberg Revisited: A New Look at Comparative Probability , 1983 .

[25]  A. Tversky,et al.  Prospect Theory : An Analysis of Decision under Risk Author ( s ) : , 2007 .

[26]  D. Schmeidler Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity , 1989 .

[27]  S. Becker,et al.  What Price Ambiguity? or the Role of Ambiguity in Decision-Making , 1964, Journal of Political Economy.

[28]  L. J. Savage,et al.  The Foundations of Statistics , 1955 .

[29]  R. Hogarth Judgement and choice: The psychology of decision , 1982 .

[30]  A. Tversky,et al.  The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. , 1981, Science.

[31]  Gordon B. Hazen,et al.  Subjectively weighted linear utility , 1987 .

[32]  A. Tversky,et al.  Rational choice and the framing of decisions , 1990 .

[33]  Nils-Eric Sahlin,et al.  Decision making with unreliable probabilities , 1983 .

[34]  R. Hogarth,et al.  Decision Making under Ambiguity , 1986 .

[35]  M. Allais Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque : critique des postulats et axiomes de l'ecole americaine , 1953 .

[36]  F. Knight The economic nature of the firm: From Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit , 2009 .

[37]  R. Hogarth,et al.  Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference. , 1985 .

[38]  Howard Kunreuther,et al.  Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions , 1985 .

[39]  Peter Gärdenfors,et al.  Unreliable probabilities, risk taking and decision making , 1988 .

[40]  P. Fishburn The Axioms of Subjective Probability , 1986 .