The political economy of organized crime : providing protection when the state does not

Organized crime emerges out of the power vaccuum that is created by the absence of state enforcement, and which can have many sources: geographic, social, and ethnic distance, prohibition, or simply collapse of state institutions. Mafias and gangs are hierarchically organized and can be thought of as providing primitive state functions, with economic costs that are typically much higher than those associated with modern governance. Though organized crime cannot be completely eradicated, its control is necessary, since it can easily corrupt existing institutions of governance. Some thoughts on what can be done to control organized crime are offered.

[1]  Conflict Resolution Under Asymmetric Information , 1998 .

[2]  Martín Sánchez-Jankowski,et al.  Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society , 1991 .

[3]  M. L. Brown The Wild East , 2001 .

[4]  David E. Kaplan,et al.  Yakuza : the explosive account of Japan's criminal underworld , 1987 .

[5]  M. Olson,et al.  The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force , 1996 .

[6]  S. Skaperdas Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights , 1991 .

[7]  Kai A. Konrad,et al.  Credible threats in extortion , 1997 .

[8]  S. Skaperdas,et al.  Gangs as Primitive States , 1993 .

[9]  Robert J. Antony The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919–1937 , 1997 .

[10]  James A. Robinson Social identity, inequality and conflict , 2001 .

[11]  M. Intriligator,et al.  Conflict, War, and Redistribution , 1985, American Political Science Review.

[12]  Ronald Wintrobe The political economy of dictatorship: Contents , 1998 .

[13]  L. Shelley Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State? , 1995 .

[14]  Kai A. Konrad,et al.  Drug policy and federalism , 1994 .

[15]  J. Hirshleifer Anarchy and its Breakdown , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  R. Godson,et al.  International organized crime , 1995 .

[17]  Jeffrey Zwiebel,et al.  The Economic Case against Drug Prohibition , 1995 .

[18]  Larry Collins Holland's Half-Baked Drug Experiment , 1999 .

[19]  Herschel I. Grossman,et al.  Proprietary public finance and economic welfare , 1994 .

[20]  Herschel I. Grossman The economics of organised crime: Rival kleptocrats: the mafia versus the state , 1996 .

[21]  M. Grindrod Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power , 1974 .

[22]  Ben Polak,et al.  A Model of a Predatory State , 1997 .

[23]  S. Solnick Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions , 1999 .

[24]  R. Findlay THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs* , 1990 .

[25]  T. Haavelmo A study in the theory of economic evolution , 1954 .