Electronic Control Unit Discrimination Using Wired Signal Distinct Native Attributes

A controller area network bus is a communications system used in modern automobiles to connect the electronic control units that implement normal vehicular operations as well as advanced autonomous safety and driver comfort features. However, these advancements come at the expense of vehicle security – researchers have shown that automobiles can be hacked by compromising electronic control units or by connecting unauthorized devices to the controller area network bus.

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