论文信息 - Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors

Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors

Abstract We study a model of repeated games with imperfect monitoring where the payoff vector is observable. In this situation, any profitable deviation is detectable by all the players but the identity of the deviator may be unknown. We design collective punishments directed against the set of potential deviators. A particular class of signals is studied for which a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73.

Tristan Tomala | Tristan Tomala

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