论文信息 - Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions

Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions

An experiment analyzing behavior in English common value auctions is reported. English auctions raise more revenue than first-price auctions only when bidders do not suffer from a strong winner's curse. Agents employ other bidders' dropout prices along with their private information as Nash bidding theory predicts. However, a simple and natural signal-averaging rule, which does not require recognizing the adverse-selection effect of winning the auction, better characterizes the data than the Nash rule. Monte Carlo simulations using FIML estimates of the signal-averaging rule predict a number of data characteristics not directly employed in the estimation procedure. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

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