Dialogism and the Distributed Language Approach: a rejoinder to Steffensen

Abstract This paper is a rejoinder to Steffensen (this journal issue: pp. 105–119). It is a discussion of some convergences and divergences between dialogism (dialogical theories) and the Distributed Language Approach (DLA). I argue that Steffensen tends to overstate these differences. But there are also some points where consensus is lacking. The paper focuses on three points. One is about what non-localisability of meaning actually amounts to. I suggest that this is chiefly a terminological issue. A more important controversy concerns sense-makings and their place in human existence. Here, DLA – in Steffensen's version – seems to look at sense-making as immersed in biological life, while dialogism treats sense-making (and related phenomena like culture, agency, consciousness and morality) as more definitional of humanity. However, there is also a trend towards an ‘extended’ dialogism, in which the embodiment of interactivity is assigned a very fundamental role. A third issue concerns the role of individuals and individualism within dialogism. In this regard, I claim that dialogism is basically an anti-individualist meta-theory, but this does not imply that individuals do not exist in a dialogically constituted world. On the contrary, both social and cultural relations and individuality are products of human interactivities.