This paper studies properties of iterated revisions. First rationality result shows that in the AGM original framework the only revision operation that satisfies two resonable properties is the trivial revision. Then an altenative to the AGM framework for studying belief revision and probability postulates is proposed Iterated revisions are the objects of this formalism and the rationality postulates deal with properties of iterated revisions. A set of rationality postulates is presented closely related to the AGM postulates. A representation result shows that those postulate simply serious limitations to the way revisions cell dope with the Principle of Minimal change. Those postulates are not suitable for belief update but then consideration raises doubts about the adequacy of previous treatments of belief implate.
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