Rational verification: game-theoretic verification of multi-agent systems

We provide a survey of the state of the art of rational verification: the problem of checking whether a given temporal logic formula ϕ is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behavior ϕ represents under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the overall framework of rational verification, we discuss key results obtained in the past few years as well as relevant related work in logic, AI, and computer science.

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