A comparative analysis of social choice functions, IV

This paper is concerned with the use of voting procedures by groups of individuals to produce a social choice. Several new conditions that voting systems might be required to meet are suggested in this paper. These criteria are varying expressions of the notion that when there are more than two alternatives, social choice should be based on the results of majority voting on pairs. Five voting procedures or social choice functions are examined with respect to these conditions plus a condition requiring the social choice set to be externally stable. Two functions of the five examined are clearly better, according to these conditions, than the remaining three.

[1]  P.-C.-F. Daunou,et al.  Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin , 1803 .

[2]  L. A. Goodman,et al.  Social Choice and Individual Values , 1951 .

[3]  Kenneth O. May,et al.  A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision , 1952 .

[4]  H. Chernoff.  Rational Selection of Decision Functions , 1954 .

[5]  D. Black.  The theory of committees and elections , 1959 .

[6]  Amartya Sen,et al.  Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions , 1969 .

[7]  Yves Laissus,et al.  Les Plantes du Roi. Note sur un grand ouvrage de botanique préparé au XVIIe siècle par l'Académie royale des Sciences , 1969 .

[8]  Thomas Schwartz,et al.  On the possibility of rational policy evaluation , 1970 .

[9]  A. Sen,et al.  Collective Choice and Social Welfare , 2017 .

[10]  P. Fishburn.  A comparative analysis of group decision methods , 1971 .

[11]  T. Schwartz.  Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum , 1972 .

[12]  Andreu Mas-Colell,et al.  General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions , 1972 .

[13]  J. H. Smith.  AGGREGATION OF PREFERENCES WITH VARIABLE ELECTORATE , 1973 .

[14]  C. Plott.  PATH INDEPENDENCE, RATIONALITY, AND SOCIAL CHOICE , 1973 .

[15]  P. Fishburn.  SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS , 1974 .

[16]  Peter C. Fishburn,et al.  Subset Choice Conditions and the Computation of Social Choice Sets , 1974 .

[17]  H. P. Young,et al.  An axiomatization of Borda's rule , 1974 .

[18]  A. Levenglick,et al.  Fair and reasonable election systems , 1975 .

[19]  H. Young.  Social Choice Scoring Functions , 1975 .

[20]  Kotaro Suzumura,et al.  Impossibility theorems without collective rationality , 1976 .

[21]  Georges Bordes,et al.  Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice , 1976 .

[22]  Charles R. Plott,et al.  Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation , 1976 .

[23]  H. Young.  Extending Condorcet's rule , 1977 .

[24]  P. Fishburn.  Condorcet Social Choice Functions , 1977 .

[25]  D. E. Campbell.  Computational Criteria for Voting Systems , 1977, British Journal of Political Science.

[26]  Hierarchical structure of participation in natural groups , 1977 .

[27]  D. J Hartfiel,et al.  A characterization result for the plurality rule , 1978 .