Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games

Abstract Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption that participation is either compulsive or unidirectional optional in collective interactions. Nevertheless, how the mutual selection rule, a more realistic participation mode, affects the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is still unclear. Here we introduce a reputation-based mutual selection rule for constituting participant groups into spatial threshold public goods games, where the public goods game can be conducted only if the participant number is not less than the threshold parameter. Interestingly, we find that moderate tolerance range results in the best environment for cooperators’ viability. Also, we show that lower member threshold is favorable for the evolution of cooperation, and correspondingly provide some typical snapshots for defectors, “active” cooperators (cooperators on which the public goods games are successfully conducted), and “inactive” cooperators. Moreover, we investigate the effects of memory factor in individuals’ reputation updating on the evolution of cooperation. Our work may provide an appropriate and alternative perspective in understanding the widespread cooperative behaviors in some realistic situations.

[1]  Long Wang,et al.  Influence of different initial distributions on robust cooperation in scale-free networks: A comparative study , 2008 .

[2]  Long Wang,et al.  Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game , 2013 .

[3]  Yongkui Liu,et al.  Social selection of game organizers promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games , 2013 .

[4]  Roger Lagunoff,et al.  On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation , 2003, J. Econ. Theory.

[5]  Long Wang,et al.  Emergence of social cooperation in threshold public goods games with collective risk. , 2009, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[6]  Long Wang,et al.  Effect of community structure on coevolutionary dynamics with dynamical linking , 2011 .

[7]  F. C. Santos,et al.  Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games , 2008, Nature.

[8]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Defector-Accelerated Cooperativeness and Punishment in Public Goods Games with Mutations , 2010, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[9]  V. Jansen,et al.  Altruism through beard chromodynamics , 2006, Nature.

[10]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review , 2013, Journal of The Royal Society Interface.

[11]  C. Hauert,et al.  Replicator dynamics for optional public good games. , 2002, Journal of theoretical biology.

[12]  Long Wang,et al.  Impact of generalized benefit functions on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with continuous strategies. , 2012, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[13]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[14]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Impact of Critical Mass on the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Public Goods Games , 2010, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[15]  Long Wang,et al.  Partner switching stabilizes cooperation in coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma. , 2009, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[16]  G. Hardin,et al.  The Tragedy of the Commons , 1968, Green Planet Blues.

[17]  C. Hauert,et al.  Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks. , 2008, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[18]  D. E. Matthews.  Evolution and the Theory of Games , 1977 .

[19]  Szabolcs Számadó,et al.  Beneficial laggards: multilevel selection, cooperative polymorphism and division of labour in threshold public good games , 2010, BMC Evolutionary Biology.

[20]  Long Wang,et al.  Expectation-driven migration promotes cooperation by group interactions. , 2012, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[21]  Long Wang,et al.  Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a small-world networked game. , 2008, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[22]  Matjaž Perc,et al.  Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders , 2012, Scientific Reports.

[23]  Long Wang,et al.  Diversity of contribution promotes cooperation in public goods games , 2010 .

[24]  E. Fehr,et al.  Altruistic punishment in humans , 2002, Nature.

[25]  C. Hauert,et al.  Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games , 2002, Science.

[26]  Xiaofeng Wang,et al.  Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game , 2012, Scientific Reports.

[27]  M. Nowak,et al.  Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring , 1998, Nature.

[28]  Martin A. Nowak,et al.  Chromodynamics of Cooperation in Finite Populations , 2007, PloS one.

[29]  Long Wang,et al.  Individual's expulsion to nasty environment promotes cooperation in public goods games , 2009 .

[30]  Martin A. Nowak,et al.  Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity , 2008, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[31]  M. Perc,et al.  Social diversity and promotion of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. , 2007, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[32]  Long Wang,et al.  Cooperation enhanced by moderate tolerance ranges in myopically selective interactions. , 2009, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[33]  Martin A Nowak,et al.  Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations , 2009, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[34]  C. Hauert,et al.  Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment , 2007, Science.

[35]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game , 2010, 1007.0431.

[36]  F. C. Santos,et al.  Evolution of cooperation under N-person snowdrift games. , 2009, Journal of theoretical biology.

[37]  Giorgio Coricelli,et al.  Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments , 2003 .

[38]  György Szabó,et al.  Phase transitions and volunteering in spatial public goods games. , 2002, Physical review letters.

[39]  C. Hauert,et al.  Punishment and reputation in spatial public goods games , 2003, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences.

[40]  F C Santos,et al.  Epidemic spreading and cooperation dynamics on homogeneous small-world networks. , 2005, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[41]  Long Wang,et al.  Partner selections in public goods games with constant group size. , 2009, Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics.

[42]  G. Szabó,et al.  Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice , 1997, cond-mat/9710096.