Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Matthias Sutter,et al. Gossip and the Efficiency of Interactions , 2019, Games Econ. Behav..
[2] Gilbert Roberts,et al. Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity , 2008, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
[3] D. Balliet,et al. Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation , 2016, Scientific Reports.
[4] Martin Strobel,et al. Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments , 2002 .
[5] G. Roberts,et al. Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas , 2013 .
[6] D. Fessler,et al. Nobody's watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. , 2005 .
[7] Bianca Beersma,et al. How the Grapevine Keeps You in Line , 2011 .
[8] N. Emler. A Social Psychology of Reputation , 1990 .
[9] Francis T. McAndrew,et al. Of Tabloids and Family Secrets: The Evolutionary Psychology of Gossip1 , 2002 .
[10] Chrysanthos Dellarocas,et al. The Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms , 2003, Manag. Sci..
[11] Robin I. M. Dunbar,et al. Human conversational behavior , 1997, Human nature.
[12] Pat Barclay. Harnessing the Power of Reputation: Strengths and Limits for Promoting Cooperative Behaviors , 2012, Evolutionary psychology : an international journal of evolutionary approaches to psychology and behavior.
[13] Robb Willer,et al. The Trouble with Invisible Men , 2010 .
[14] Jennifer Stellar,et al. The virtues of gossip: reputational information sharing as prosocial behavior. , 2012, Journal of personality and social psychology.
[15] K. Pauwels,et al. Effects of Word-of-Mouth versus Traditional Marketing: Findings from an Internet Social Networking Site , 2009 .
[16] Martin A. Nowak,et al. Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment , 2013, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[17] Robb Willer,et al. Gossip and Ostracism Promote Cooperation in Groups , 2014, Psychological science.
[18] Gary Charness,et al. Trust and Trustworthiness Reputations in an Investment Game , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..
[19] Y. Kashima,et al. Bad habit or social good? How perceptions of gossiper morality are related to gossip content , 2015 .
[20] M. Abraham,et al. Reputation formation in economic transactions , 2016 .
[21] Flaminio Squazzoni,et al. Reputational cues in repeated trust games , 2009 .
[22] K. Arrow. The limits of organization , 1974 .
[23] Robin I. M. Dunbar. Gossip in Evolutionary Perspective , 2004 .
[24] Robin I. M. Dunbar. Groups, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language , 1996 .
[25] Dirk Semmann,et al. Strategic investment in reputation , 2004, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology.
[26] J. Bryson,et al. Value homophily benefits cooperation but motivates employing incorrect social information. , 2015, Journal of theoretical biology.
[27] Dirk Semmann,et al. Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity , 2007, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[28] David M. Kreps,et al. Reputation and imperfect information , 1982 .
[29] U. Fischbacher. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments , 1999 .
[30] D. Fudenberg,et al. Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed , 1992 .
[31] D. Wilson,et al. Gossip and other aspects of language as group-level adaptations , 2000 .
[32] David G. Rand,et al. The value of reputation , 2012, Journal of The Royal Society Interface.
[33] T. Offerman,et al. Fostering Cooperation through the Enhancement of Own Vulnerability , 2012, Games Econ. Behav..
[34] Recordkeeping alters economic history by promoting reciprocity , 2009, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
[35] D. Sperber,et al. Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective , 2012 .
[36] Joyce E. Berg,et al. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History , 1995 .
[37] Jesse M. Bering,et al. Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game , 2008 .
[38] Joey T. Cheng,et al. Gossip as an effective and low-cost form of punishment , 2012, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
[39] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence☆ , 1982 .
[40] Eric K. Foster. Research on Gossip: Taxonomy, Methods, and Future Directions , 2004 .
[41] A. Greif. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition , 1993 .
[42] M. Nowak,et al. Fairness versus reason in the ultimatum game. , 2000, Science.
[43] David H. Reiley,et al. Pennies from Ebay: The Determinants of Price in Online Auctions , 2000 .
[44] O. Leimar,et al. The evolution of cooperation in mobile organisms , 1993, Animal Behaviour.
[45] Mayuko Nakamaru,et al. Evolution of rumours that discriminate lying defectors , 2004 .
[46] Ben Greiner,et al. Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE , 2015, Journal of the Economic Science Association.
[47] Robert B. Wilson,et al. Game-theoretic models of bargaining: Reputations in games and markets , 1985 .