The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Recent work has suggested that punishment is detrimental because punishment provokes retaliation, not cooperation, resulting in lower overall payoffs. These findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal: in reality individuals are expected to vary in the power with which they can punish defectors. Here, we allowed strong players to interact with weak players in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game with punishment. Defecting players were most likely to switch to cooperation if the partner cooperated: adding punishment yielded no additional benefit and, under some circumstances, increased the chance that the partner would both defect and retaliate against the punisher. Our findings show that, in a two-player game, cooperation begets cooperation and that punishment does not seem to yield any additional benefits. Further work should explore whether strong punishers might prevail in multi-player games.

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